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on 13 May 2014, the Court of Justice of the European Union recognized a right 
under the EU Data Protection Directive 95/46 for individuals to suppress links 
generated by Internet search engines (popularly referred to as the 'right to be 
forgotten'). The Court’s holdings leave many important questions open, both in 
regard to technical legal issues and more high-level issues of general jurisprudential 
and societal importance. The judgment suffers from the Court’s traditionally 
minimalist style of argument and reluctance to adopt a more open and discursive 
style, and its failure to take the significance of the case for the Internet into 
account. The material and territorial scope of the right to suppression must be 
defined in a way that is proportionate to the ability to implement it, if the 
judgment is to effectively protect fundamental rights in practice. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
On 13 May 2014, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) issued a 
judgment of great significance for data protection law, EU fundamental rights law, 
and the Internet. In Case C-131/12 Google Spain v. AEPD and Mario Costeja 
Gonzalez,1 the Court made several important pronouncements about EU data 
protection law, and in particular recognized a right under the EU Data Protection 
Directive 95/46 for individuals to suppress links generated by Internet search 
engines (popularly referred to as the 'right to be forgotten').  
The judgment has probably been the subject of more academic commentary 
in a few months than other CJEU data protection cases have been in the 16 years 
since the Directive came into force.2 It has received a wide range of reactions, 
from being hailed as a 'constitutional moment' resulting in a significant extension 
of fundamental rights in the EU,3 to 'the most important right you’ve never heard 
of',4 to a violation of the fundamental principle of freedom of expression,5 to 
'preposterous'6 and 'deeply immoral'.7 It has also been the subject of squabbles 
between polemicists in the EU and the US.8  
The judgment is significant for its analysis of issues such as whether an 
Internet search engine should be considered to be a data controller or a data 
processor; the territorial application of EU data protection law; and the extension 
of data protection rights to the Internet. It also illustrates the stronger legal 
protection for fundamental rights since the entry into force on 1 December 2009 
of the Lisbon Treaty,9 which explicitly grants individuals a right to data protection 
                                                     
1 The judgment is available at 
<http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document_print.jsf?doclang=EN&docid=152065>. 
2 See the website <http://www.cambridge-code.org/googlespain.html>, listing dozens of academic blog 
entries on the case in the few months since it was issued.  
3 Indra Spieker genannt Döhmann and M. Steinbels, 'Der EuGH erfindet sich gerade neu', 14 May 2014, 
<http://www.verfassungsblog.de/der-eugh-erfindet-sich-gerade-neu/#.U_mOj7ySy-U>. 
4 Eric Posner, 'We All Have the Right to be Forgotten', 14 May 2014, 
<http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/view_from_chicago/2014/05/the_european_right_
to_be_forgotten_is_just_what_the_internet_needs.html>. 
5 See 'Index Blasts EU Court Ruling on the ‘Right to be Forgotten’', 13 May 2014, 
<http://www.indexoncensorship.org/2014/05/index-blasts-eu-court-ruling-right-forgotten/>. 
6 Stewart Baker, 'Contest! Hacking the Right to be Forgotten', 7 June 2014, 
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/06/07/contest-hacking-the-
right-to-be-forgotten/>. 
7 Sophie Curtis and Alice Philipson, 'Wikipedia Founder: EU’s Right to be Forgotten is ‘Deeply 
Immoral’', 6 August 2014, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/wikipedia/11015901/EU-ruling-
on-link-removal-deeply-immoral-says-Wikipedia-founder.html>. 
8 Compare, for example, Joe McNamee, 'Google’s Right to be Forgotten—Industrial Scale 
Misinformation?', 9 June 2014, <http://edri.org/forgotten/>, with Craig A. Newman, '‘A Right to be 
Forgotten’ will Cost Europe', 26 May 2014, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-right-to-be-
forgotten-will-cost-europe/2014/05/26/93bb0e8c-e131-11e3-9743-bb9b59cde7b9_story.html>. 
9 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European 
Community, [2007] OJ C306/1. See also Orla Lynskey, 'Deconstructing Data Protection: The ‘Added-
Value’ of a Right to Data Protection in the EU Legal Order', 63 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 
569 (2014). 
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in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)10 and gives full 
legal effect to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.11 The judgment provides 
one of the first indications of how the Lisbon framework affects the online 
sphere, and also represents a kind of 'test run' for many of the rights contained in 
the EU’s proposed General Data Protection Regulation.12 
 Thus far, many commentators on the judgment have tended to praise or 
condemn it based on their own philosophical and political views. This article will 
instead analyze the legal issues that led the Court to its decision, and examine their 
implications for data protection, EU law, and the Internet.  
After giving a brief description of the facts in the case, it will describe how 
the Court’s holdings leave many important questions open, in regard to both 
technical legal issues and more high-level issues of jurisprudential and societal 
importance. The judgment also does not take the significance of the case for the 
Internet into account, and suffers from the Court’s traditionally minimalist style of 
argument. The material and territorial scope of the right to suppress Internet 
search engine results are potentially much wider than the ability to implement the 
right effectively, which exemplifies the tendency in EU data protection law to 
impose wide-ranging obligations on data processing with little regard to how they 
can be enforced. This suggests that a way must be found to define the scope of 
the right to suppression in a way that is proportionate to the ability to enforce and 
implement it, if it is to provide real protection in practice. 
 
 
 
II. THE JUDGMENT 
 
The facts of the case, and the holding of the Court, can be briefly described based 
on the judgment and the opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen that preceded 
it.13 
The plaintiff in the case, Mr. Costeja González, was mentioned in two 
announcements published in a Spanish newspaper dealing with attachment 
proceedings in a real estate auction prompted by social security debts. The 
newspaper had originally published the announcements in 1998, as required by 
Spanish law. At a later date, an online version of the newspaper became available, 
so that the announcements became accessible via a Google search. The plaintiff 
complained in 2009 to the newspaper seeking removal of the announcements 
                                                     
10 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), [2010] OJ 
C83/47, Article 16(1).  
11 Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), [2008] OJ C115/13, Article 6. See 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, [2010] OJ C83/2, Article 8. 
12 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data 
(General Data Protection Regulation), COM(2012) 11 final. 
13 Case C-131/12, Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen, 25 June 2013, 
<http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=138782&doclang=EN>. 
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from the online edition, contending that the attachment proceedings were over 
and that the announcements were thus no longer of any relevance. The newspaper 
refused, as it said it was legally obliged to publish them. He also complained to 
Google Spain SL, seeking deletion of references to the announcements in the 
results produced by the Google search engine.14 In response, Google passed the 
request on to Google Inc. in the US, stating that the latter entity was the operator 
of the search service.  
The plaintiff then complained to the Spanish Data Protection Agency (DPA) 
against the newspaper and both Google entities, claiming that the newspaper 
should be required to take measures so that his personal data did not appear, and 
that Google should ensure that they did not appear in results produced by its 
search engines. On 30 July 2010, the Spanish DPA rejected the complaint against 
the newspaper, finding that it had a legal obligation to publish the information 
under an order of the Spanish Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. However, the 
DPA upheld the complaints against both Google entities, and ordered them to 
take measures so that the complainant’s data no longer appeared in Google search 
results. The two Google entities then appealed the DPA’s decision to the Spanish 
Audiencia Nacional (National High Court), which stayed the actions and referred 
the following questions to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling (quoted here in 
edited form from para. 20 of the judgment): 
 
 1. With regard to the territorial application of Directive [95/46] and, 
consequently, of the Spanish data protection legislation: 
(a) must it be considered that an ‘establishment’, within the meaning of 
Article 4(1)(a) of Directive 95/46, exists […] when the undertaking providing 
the search engine sets up in a Member State an office or subsidiary for the 
purpose of promoting and selling advertising space on the search engine, 
which orientates its activity towards the inhabitants of that State […] 
 
2. As regards the activity of search engines as providers of content in relation 
to Directive 95/46 […]: 
(a) in relation to the activity of [Google Search], as a provider of content, 
consisting in locating information published or included on the net by third 
parties, indexing it automatically, storing it temporarily and finally making it 
available to internet users according to a particular order of preference, when 
that information contains personal data of third parties: must an activity like 
the one described be interpreted as falling within the concept of ‘processing 
of […] data’ used in Article 2(b) of Directive 95/46? 
(b) If the answer to the foregoing question is affirmative, and once again in 
                                                     
14 It is unclear from the judgment and from the Advocate General’s opinion exactly which search 
domains were covered by the complaints (i.e., whether they included the main Google search engine 
google.com, the Spanish Google search engine google.es, or both; see par. 43 of the judgment).  
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relation to an activity like the one described: 
must Article 2(d) of Directive 95/46 be interpreted as meaning that the 
undertaking managing [Google Search] is to be regarded as the ‘controller’ of 
the personal data contained in the web pages that it indexes? 
 
 3. Regarding the scope of the right of erasure and/or the right to object, in 
relation to the ‘derecho al olvido’ (the ‘right to be forgotten’), the following 
question is asked: 
must it be considered that the rights to erasure and blocking of data, provided 
for in Article 12(b), and the right to object, provided for by [subparagraph (a) 
of the first paragraph of Article 14] of Directive 95/46, extend to enabling 
the data subject to address himself to search engines in order to prevent 
indexing of the information relating to him personally, published on third 
parties’ web pages, invoking his wish that such information should not be 
known to internet users when he considers that it might be prejudicial to him 
or he wishes it to be consigned to oblivion, even though the information in 
question has been lawfully published by third parties?' 
 
On June 25, 2013, Advocate General Jääskinen issued his opinion in the case and 
answered the three main questions posed as follows (in para. 138 of his Opinion): 
 
 1. Processing of personal data is carried out in the context of the activities of 
an 'establishment' of the controller within the meaning of Article 4(1)(a) of 
the EU Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC 'when the undertaking 
providing the internet search engine sets up in a Member State, for the 
purposes of promoting and selling advertising space on the search engine, an 
office or subsidiary which orientates its activity towards the inhabitants of 
that State.' 
 
 2. An internet search engine service provider that located information 
published by third party web sites 'processes' personal data in the sense of 
Article 2(b) of Directive 95/46 when that information contains personal data. 
However, it should not be considered a 'controller' of the data processing in 
the sense of Article 2(d) of the Directive as long as it does not index or 
archive personal data against the instructions of the web page’s publisher. 
 
 3. The rights provided by the Directive (and in particular the rights to erasure 
and blocking of data provided for in Article 12(b), and the right to object 
provided for in Article 14(a)) do not confer to an individual a right to prevent 
a search engine service provider from indexing the information relating to 
him that is published legally on third parties’ web pages. 
 
In its judgment, published on 13 May 2014, the Court held as follows (see para. 
100): 
                           3/2015 
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 --The activity of an Internet search engine in finding information placed on 
the Internet by third parties, indexing it, storing it, and making it available in a 
particular order of preference constitutes data processing. However, in 
contrast to the Opinion of the Advocate General, the CJEU found that the 
operator of a search engine is to be considered a data controller rather than a 
data processor. This is because the operator determines the purposes and 
means of data processing by the search engine (para. 33), and because the 
objective of the relevant provisions of the Directive is to ensure effective and 
complete protect of data subjects through a broad definition of the concept 
of 'controller' (para. 34). The Court determined that Google Inc. is both the 
actual operator (para. 43, second bullet) and the data controller (para. 60) of 
the Google search engine. 
 
 --The processing of personal data by a search engine that is operated by an 
undertaking established outside of the EU but that has an establishment in 
the EU is carried out 'in the context of the activities' of such establishment 
within the meaning of Article 4(1)(a) of the Directive, if such establishment 
promotes and sells advertising space in such Member State that serves to 
make the search engine profitable (para. 55), thus leading to the application of 
EU data protection law. This is so because the activities of the local 
establishments are 'inextricably linked' to the activities of the Google 
headquarters in the US since their activities allow the search engine to be 
economically viable (para. 56). In this respect, EU data protection law should 
be interpreted to be given a 'particularly broad territorial scope' in order to 
prevent individuals being deprived of the protection of the Directive and of 
such protection being circumvented (paragraph 54).  
  
 --Articles 12(b) and 14(a) of the Directive should be interpreted to mean that 
an individual has a right to have a search engine remove links to web pages 
published by third parties from search results that are made on the basis of a 
search on a person’s name. This right applies regardless of whether the 
material indexed is removed from such third party web pages themselves, and 
regardless of whether it was posted lawfully (paragraphs 62-99). 
 
 --Exercise of this right must respect a 'fair balance' between the fundamental 
rights of individuals to delete links and the interest of others in having access 
to such information (paragraph 81). The rights of the individual should 
'override, as a rule, not only the economic interest of the operator of the 
search engine but also the interest of the general public in finding that 
information upon a search relating to the data subject’s name', though the 
individual’s rights should not take precedence if other factors would justify an 
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interference with them, such as the data subject’s role in public life (paragraph 
97). 
 
 
  
III. LEGAL ISSUES RAISED BY THE JUDGMENT 
 
Three legal issues raised by the judgment are particularly significant, namely its 
material scope; its territorial scope; and the threshold for invoking the rights 
affirmed by the CJEU. As discussed below, the answer to each of these questions 
is unclear. 
 
A. MATERIAL SCOPE 
 
Confusion has been created by widespread reports in the media that the CJEU 
created a new 'right to be forgotten' allowing individuals to have information 
about them deleted from the Internet.15 The judgment and the opinion of the 
Advocate General have contributed to this confusion by their use of the term:  the 
Advocate General stated that the case involved the question of whether to 
recognize the right to be forgotten (para. 6 of his opinion), and while the Court 
did not use the term in its rulings (para. 100), it did refer to it in the judgment (see 
paras. 20 and 91). 
In fact, the judgment does not create a right to be forgotten. A careful 
reading shows that the right affirmed by the Court is that of obliging the operators 
of Internet search engines to suppress links to web pages from the list of search 
results made on the basis of a person’s name (see para. 100), not a right to have 
data itself deleted from the Internet. Indeed, search engines could not themselves 
delete information from the web sites that they index, since these reside on servers 
hosted by other parties. For this reason, the right will be referred to herein as the 
'right to suppression' of links to search engine results. This right is based on the 
Directive’s Article 12(b) (covering the right to rectify, erase or block data) and 
Article 14(a) (covering right to object to data processing) of the Directive (see 
para. 82). 
The questions referred to the Court concern 'Internet search engines', a term 
which the Court defines as 'a provider of content which consists in finding 
information published or placed on the internet by third parties, indexing it 
automatically, storing it temporarily and, finally, making it available to internet 
users according to a particular order of preference' (para. 21). However, this 
definition raises questions. Providers of Internet search engines, such as Google, 
                                                     
15 See, e.g., Foo Yung Chee, 'Europe’s Top Court: People Have Right to be Forgotten on Internet', 13 
May 2014, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/13/eu-google-dataprotection-
idUSL6N0NZ23Q20140513>, stating that 'The case underlines the battle between advocates of free 
expression and supporters of privacy rights, who say people should have the ‘right to be forgotten’ 
meaning that they should be able to remove their digital traces from the Internet'.  
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Bing (i.e., Microsoft), Yahoo etc. are obviously covered.16 But countless other 
Internet services provide large-scale search functionality (e.g., social networks, 
Internet archives, news databases etc.) and many web sites other than search 
engines have a search function embedded in them. It may also be questioned 
whether the judgment should be limited to services that are accessible to all 
Internet users; for example, many information services are accessible via the 
Internet and include a search functionality (e.g., commercial news databases), but 
may be used only with a password or other access limitation. While access to these 
services is limited, they may still have millions of users.  
The popular perception seems to be that the judgment concerns a few large 
Internet search engines, but if one views the Court as taking a functional approach 
to the definition of the services covered, the question becomes whether a 
principled distinction between Internet search engines and other Internet sites 
with large-scale search functionality (including commercial databases) can be made 
such that the judgment would not apply to the latter. From the author’s point of 
view, such a distinction is not obvious, particularly in view of the fact that the 
judgment is based so strongly on the protection of fundamental rights. In 
particular, the Court refers to the objective of the Data Protection Directive 95/46 
'of ensuring effective and complete protection of the fundamental rights and 
freedoms of natural persons, and in particular their right to privacy, with respect 
to the processing of personal data', and adds that 'those words cannot be 
interpreted restrictively' (para. 53). Thus, it seems that the material scope of 
judgment should be broadly interpreted to extend beyond particular Internet 
search engines to also cover a wide variety of online services that provide search 
functionality on a large scale. 
The scope of searches covered by the judgment is also unclear. The Court’s 
ruling covers 'a search made on the basis of a person’s name' (para. 100), but the 
third question referred to the Court concerning the suppression of search engine 
results refers instead to 'indexing of the information relating to him personally' 
(para. 20), though the summary of the facts by the Court seems to indicate that the 
complainant was concerned about searches made on his name (para. 14). One 
could argue that the plaintiff had only complained about searches on his name, 
and thus there was no need for the Court to consider other types of searches. 
However, research has demonstrated that individuals can easily be identified by 
searching for data fields other than their name,17 and given the Court’s emphasis 
on the protection of fundamental rights, it seems difficult to argue that the scope 
                                                     
16 See Press Release, 'European DPAs meet with search engines on the ‘right to be forgotten’', 25 July 
2014, <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/press-material/press-
release/art29_press_material/20140725_wp29_press_release_right_to_be_forgotten.pdf>, describing a 
meeting the Article Working Party had with Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo. 
17 See Paul Ohm, 'Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization', 
57 UCLA Law Review 1701, 1705 (2010), citing a study stating that a search using postal code, date of 
birth, and sex allows the identification of 87% of people in the US. 
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of the search terms covered should be limited to names, if this would result in a 
gap in protection. 
 
B. TERRITORIAL SCOPE 
 
The relevant issues concerning the judgment’s territorial scope can be divided into 
two categories, namely first of all the intra-EU application of data protection law 
(i.e., determining which EU Member State’s law applies to the processing), and 
second, the application of EU data protection law to data processing outside the 
EU. 
With regard to the first set of issues, the CJEU applied EU data protection 
law (and thus Spanish law) to Google Spain based on Article 4(1)(a) of the 
Directive, i.e., on the basis that data processing by the Google search engine is 
carried out in the context of the activities of Google Spain as an establishment of 
Google Inc. The two crucial assumptions underlying this conclusion are that, first, 
Google Inc. is a data controller, and second, that the Google search engine 
processes data in the context of the activities of Google Spain. The first 
assumption (that Google Inc. is a data controller) directly contradicts the 
Advocate General, who had found that an Internet search engine is not a data 
controller with regard to the personal data on source web pages hosted on third 
party servers (paras. 89-90 of his Opinion). However, the Court found that the 
definition of 'data controller' should be broadly construed, in order to provide 
'effective and complete protection of data subjects' (para. 34). This conclusion has 
broad implications, as many web services seem to operate on an assumption that 
they are 'data processors', and are not subject to the full panoply of data protection 
compliance obligations that apply to controllers under the Directive.  
In its conclusion that the Google search engine is a data controller, the Court 
did not engage with the arguments made by the Advocate General that the 
concept of a data controller in the context of the Internet requires it to 'apply a 
rule of reason, in other words, the principle of proportionality, in interpreting the 
scope of the Directive in order to avoid unreasonable and excessive legal 
consequences' (para. 30 of the Advocate General’s opinion). The Court also could 
have built on its statement that 'the operator of the search engine as the controller 
in respect of that processing must ensure, within the framework of its responsibilities, 
powers and capabilities [emphasis added], that that processing meets the requirements 
of Directive 95/46, in order that the guarantees laid down by the directive may 
have full effect' (para. 83). That is, the Court could have indicated that even if a 
search engine that processes information put on the Internet by a countless 
number of parties around the world is to be considered a data controller, the level 
of compliance responsibilities it has should be judged within its possibilities for 
exercising them, and that these possibilities may be different than is the case with 
many other types of data controllers.  
With regard to the second assumption (that search engine data are processed 
in the context of the activities of Google Spain), many DPAs have long reached a 
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similar conclusion in cases where an EU-based establishment is closely involved in 
data processing that is carried out by its non-EU parent company. The author 
wrote as early as 2003 that 'in many cases Member State DPAs will be quite 
imaginative in finding that there is some sort of connection between the 
processing and the establishment' of a company in a Member State, and that this 
may lead to the entity being considered to be 'established' in such Member State 
for data protection purposes.18 However, the CJEU’s statement that the economic 
support provided by Google Spain for the Google search engine (i.e., the support 
provided for the Google group’s advertising activity) results in it being 
'inextricably linked' with the operation of the search engine by Google Inc. is the 
most authoritative confirmation yet that an EU-based subsidiary of a multinational 
company with headquarters in another region may be subject to EU data 
protection law even if it doesn’t actually operate the data processing service at 
issue. This conclusion is based largely on the strengthening of the fundamental 
right to data protection under the Lisbon framework (see para. 58 of the 
judgment). It also confirms that each EU establishment of a non-EU based data 
controller is subject to the national law of its respective Member State of 
establishment. Further clarification of the intra-EU application of national data 
protection laws under the Directive will come when the CJEU issues its judgment 
in the pending Weltimmo case.19 
The second set of issues (application of EU data protection law outside the 
EU) is of perhaps more wide-ranging importance. The Court did not deal with the 
application of EU data protection law to processing by data controllers established 
outside the EU under Article 4(1)(c) of the Directive (see para. 61), since it found 
that EU data protection law applies to Google Spain under Article 4(1)(a) and thus 
was able to sidestep consideration of whether Article 4(1)(c) should apply.20 
Despite the fact that the data controller (Google Inc.) is located outside the EU, 
and the service at issue (the Google search engine) is accessible around the world 
via the Internet, the Court failed to say anything concerning the case’s implications 
for non-EU data controllers, and virtually nothing about its potential impact on 
                                                     
18 See Christopher Kuner, European Data Privacy Law and Online Business (OUP 2003), at 95, stating that is 
the case under Finnish and Swedish law, for example. 
19 Case C-230/14 Weltimmo, 
<http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=154887&pageIndex=0&doclang=
EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=7662>. In this case, which was referred to the CJEU on 
12 May 2014 by a Hungarian court, the questions referred include the following one: 'Can Article 4(1)(a) 
of the data protection directive, read in conjunction with recitals 18 to 20 of its preamble and 
Articles 1(2) and 28(1) thereof, be interpreted as meaning that the Hungarian Data Protection and 
Freedom of Information Authority (a Magyar Adatvédelmi és Információszabadság Hatóság, ‘the data 
protection authority’) may not apply the Hungarian law on data protection, as national law, to an operator 
of a property dealing website established only in another Member State, even if it also advertises 
Hungarian property whose owners transfer the data relating to such property probably from Hungarian 
territory to a facility (server) for data storage and data processing belonging to the operator of the 
website?' 
20 The Court raised the question of the applicability of EU law under Article 4(1)(c) in para. 44, but stated 
in para. 61 that there was no need to examine this question further. 
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the Internet.21 This is particularly striking since in its only previous case dealing 
with data protection on the Internet, the Court held that the Directive should not 
be interpreted so as to be applicable to the entire Internet.22 The judgment affirms 
a right to have search engine results suppressed under certain circumstances, but 
gives no indication of the territorial scope of the right, and does not address the 
extent to which the right applies outside the EU. 
The Court did not limit assertion of the right to suppression to EU 
individuals, or to search engines operated under specific domains. An individual 
seeking to assert a right under the Directive need not be a citizen of an EU 
Member State,23 or satisfy any other jurisdictional requirements under private 
international law,24 as long as the act of data processing on which his or her claim 
is based is subject to EU data protection law under Article 4. Thus, the judgment 
seems to place no territorial limits on application of the right, so that it could 
apply to requests for suppression from individuals anywhere in the world.25 
For example, it seems that under the judgment there would be no reason why 
a Chinese citizen in China who uses a US-based Internet search engine with a 
subsidiary in the EU could not assert the right affirmed in the judgment against 
the EU subsidiary with regard to results generated by the search engine.26 Since 
only the US entity running the search engine would have the power to amend the 
search results, in effect the Chinese individual would be using EU data protection 
law as a vehicle to bring a claim against the US entity. The judgment therefore 
potentially applies EU data protection law to the entire Internet, a situation that 
was not foreseen when the Directive was enacted.27 This could lead to forum 
shopping and 'right to suppression tourism' by individuals with no connection to 
the EU other than the fact that they use Internet services that are also accessible 
there. Even if the judgment is likely to be interpreted in practice more restrictively 
                                                     
21 The only such mention occurs in para. 81, stating that 'the removal of links from the list of results 
could, depending on the information at issue, have effects upon the legitimate interest of internet users 
potentially interested in having access to that information […]'  
22 Case C-101/01 Bodil Lindqvist [2003] ECR I-12971, at para. 69. 
23 See Directive 95/46, Recital 2, stating that it applies 'whatever the nationality or residence of natural 
persons […]' See also Christopher Kuner, 'Foreign Nationals and Data Protection Law: A Transatlantic 
Analysis', in: Data Protection 2014: How to Restore Trust 213 (Hielke Hijmans and Herke Kranenbourg eds.) 
(intersentia 2014). 
24 See Article 29 Working Party, 'Working document on determining the application of EU data 
protection law to personal data processing on the Internet by non-EU based websites' (WP 56, 30 May 
2002), at 6; Lokke Moerel, Binding Corporate Rules (OUP 2012), at 152. 
25 See, e.g., Stewart Baker, 'Inside Europe’s Censorship Machinery', Washington Post, 8 September 2014, 
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/09/08/inside-europes-
censorship-machinery/>, presenting a case in which Google apparently considered a suppression request 
from an American citizen based in the US. For further discussion of the territorial scope of the judgment, 
see Christopher Kuner, 'The right to be forgotten and the global reach of EU data protection law', 
Concurring Opinions, 1 June 2014, <http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2014/06/the-right-to-
be-forgotten-and-the-global-reach-of-eu-data-protection-law.html>. 
26 Article 3(2) of the proposed EU General Data Protection Regulation (n 12) would limit the possibility 
of asserting the right to be forgotten by individuals without any connection to the EU, since the 
application of EU data protection law would be limited to 'data subjects residing in the Union'. 
27 See Bodil Lindqvist (n 22), paras. 68-70. 
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than this,28 such broad application cannot be excluded based on the wording of 
the judgment.  
EU data protection law is to be construed broadly in order to protect against 
its circumvention,29 but there must be some limits to its territorial application, if it 
is not to be universally applicable to the entire Internet.  It is thus important not 
only to affirm when the fundamental right of data protection applies to the 
Internet, but also to determine when it does not apply. As Milanovic states: 
  
 the positive obligation of a state to ensure the human rights of persons within 
its jurisdiction from violations by private parties is not absolute, as states are 
neither omniscient nor omnipotent. What they must do is to exercise due 
diligence, i.e. to take all measures reasonably within their power in order to 
prevent violations of human rights.30  
 
Legislation and case law in both EU Member States and third countries have been 
used to limit jurisdiction when a controversy or the parties do not have sufficient 
connection to the forum (e.g., with regard to libel tourism in the UK31 and foreign 
tort claims in the US32), and similar action may be needed to limit the right to 
suppression. 
 
C. CONDITIONS FOR EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT 
 
Individuals, companies operating web sites, and data protection regulators need to 
know the conditions under which the right to suppress search engine results can 
be exercised, and what limitations exist on it. The judgment is less than clear in 
this regard.  
It seems that the threshold for invoking the right is low, so that it may be 
applied in a wide variety of situations involving search results. This conclusion is 
supported by the emphasis the CJEU put on the individual’s fundamental rights 
guaranteed by the Charter (para. 97). Some DPAs have indicated that to the extent 
they become involved in cases involving assertion of the right, they will focus on 
                                                     
28 See David Smith [author’s note: Deputy UK Information Commissioner and Director of Data 
Protection], 'Four things we’ve learned from the Google judgment', 20 May 2014, 
<http://iconewsblog.wordpress.com/2014/05/20/four-things-weve-learned-from-the-eu-google-
judgment/>, stating that the ICO will focus on 'concerns linked to clear evidence of damage and distress 
to individuals' in enforcing the right. 
29 See para. 54 of the judgment, indicating the policy of the Directive against the circumvention of EU 
data protection law. See also Christopher Kuner, Transborder Data Flows and Data Privacy Law (OUP 2013), 
chapter 5. 
30 Marko Milanovic, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties (OUP 2011), at 210. 
31 See the UK Defamation Act 2013, section 9(2), which limits the jurisdiction of the UK courts in certain 
defamation cases unless England or Wales 'are clearly the most appropriate place in which to bring an 
action […]' 
32 See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013), in which the US Supreme Court 
limited application of the US Alien Tort Claims Act with regard to actions taking place outside the US. 
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ones where there is 'clear evidence of damage and distress to individuals'.33 While 
such prioritization is understandable from a practical standpoint, the ability of 
DPAs to limit the judgment to such situations seems legally doubtful, as the Court 
remarked that the right applies regardless of whether inclusion of an individual’s 
name in search results 'causes prejudice' (para. 96). 
The Court addressed the crucial issue of what the legal basis is under the 
Directive for data processing by Internet search engines, stating that 'under Article 
7 of Directive 95/46, of processing such as that at issue in the main proceedings 
carried out by the operator of a search engine, that processing is capable of being 
covered by the ground in Article 7(f)' (para. 73), which requires a balancing of the 
opposing rights and interests of data subjects and data controllers (para. 74). In 
this regard, the Court makes it clear that the individual’s data protection and 
privacy rights under Articles 7 and 8 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
generally outweigh the economic interests of the search engine operator and the 
rights of Internet users in using a search engine to locate information (para. 97). 
However, the Court also states that suppression may be refused in specific cases, 
based on a balancing test that considers factors such as 'the nature of the 
information in question and its sensitivity for the data subject’s private life and on 
the interest of the public in having that information, […] [and on] the role played 
by the data subject in public life' (para 81).  
It seems that the Court expects the right to suppression to be implemented in 
a way that allows individuals to exercise it easily, quickly, and effectively.34 This 
suggests that there should be a presumption that the right will apply by default in 
most cases, and that it should be enforced quickly by the data controller. The 
Court does recognize that there are other important interests competing with the 
right to suppression, but the wording and tone of the judgment makes it clear that 
instances in which the individual’s assertion of the right to suppression are 
overridden by other interests are to be regarded as exceptional.35 The Court 
mentions 'the important role played by the Internet and search engines in modern 
society' (para. 80) only in the context of the risk to develop a detailed profile of an 
individual, rather than with regard to the societal benefits that the Internet brings. 
The Court also gives little assistance in determining those cases in which the right 
to suppression should be overridden, besides listing the three criteria mentioned 
above in para. 81. 
The judgment conflates the concepts of privacy and data protection, in that it 
makes assertion of the right to suppression dependent on factors such as the 
sensitivity of the data for the individual’s private life and his or her role in public 
life that are closely related to the protection of private life (i.e., privacy), rather 
                                                     
33 Smith (n 28). 
34 See, e.g., para. 84 of the judgment, rejecting the possibility of requiring individuals first to obtain 
erasure of information relating to them from the publishers of web sites, since if this were required, 'given 
the ease with which information published on a website can be replicated on other sites and the fact that 
persons responsible for its publication are not always subject to European Union legislation, effective and 
complete protection of data users could not be achieved […]'  
35 See, e.g., para. 81. 
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than just control over the processing of personal data (i.e., data protection). 
Indeed, the Court states that search engines are likely 'to affect significantly the 
fundamental rights to privacy and to the protection of personal data' (para. 80), so 
that the judgment continues a trend in which the CJEU considers privacy-related 
issues as central to its decisions on data protection.36 
 
 
 
IV. HIGH-LEVEL ISSUES 
 
Taking a step back from the technical legal issues, the judgment also raises a 
number of important jurisprudential, philosophical, and societal ones. 
 
A. STYLE OF THE JUDGMENT 
 
The primary task of the Court was to answer the questions referred to it by the 
Spanish Audiencia Nacional. However, within this mandate, the Court has some 
flexibility to use a style of judgment that fits the case, based on factors such as the 
precision of the questions referred to it, whether the Court has already ruled on 
the points in question, and the extent to which questions of fact or of national law 
still have to be determined.37 
The case has obvious international implications, because the data controller 
of the search engine is located outside the EU, as are many of the web sites 
hosting material that are indexed by search engines, and because the Internet by its 
nature allows global access to information. Thus, the Court could have provided 
some discussion of the case’s importance for global communication on the 
Internet. However, the international aspects of the case are barely mentioned at all 
by the CJEU, and then only in the sections describing the facts of the case (for 
example para. 43), not in the legal discussion. This is in contrast to the opinion of 
the Advocate General,38 and to the Court’s 2003 Lindqvist judgment,39 which both 
contain discussion of the impact of the relevant legal issues on the Internet. The 
judgment instead focuses almost completely on interpretation of the relevant 
provisions of the Data Protection Directive, the Charter of Fundamental Rights, 
and the case law of the CJEU, i.e., on EU law. 
                                                     
36 See Juliane Kokott and Christoph Sobotta, 'The Distinction between Privacy and Data Protection in 
the Jurisprudence of the CJEU and the ECtHR', 3 International Data Privacy Law 222 (2013), at 223, stating 
that 'the jurisprudence has justifiably considered privacy to be at the core of data protection'; Paul De 
Hert and Serge Gutwirth, ‘Data Protection in the Case Law of Strasbourg and Luxemburg: 
Constitutionalisation in Action’, in: Reinventing data protection? (Serge Gurthwirth, Yves Poullet, Paul De 
Hert, J. Nouwt, and Cecile de Terwagne eds.) 3 (Springer Science 2009). 
37 See Koen Lenaerts, 'How the ECJ Thinks: A Study on Judicial Legitimacy', 36 Fordham International Law 
Journal 1302, 1344-45 (2013). 
38 See, for example, paras. 25-31. 
39 See, for example, paras. 62-71. 
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While it would exceed the scope of this article to consider in detail the 
working style of the Court, its minimalistic, detached style of judgment is a regular 
feature of the CJEU’s jurisprudence. The Court’s style has been variously 
described by scholars of EU law as 'self-referential and detached',40 'overly 
abstract, vague, and elliptical',41 and 'cryptic […] [and] Cartesian'.42 The Court 
apparently limits on purpose its arguments to 'the very essential', and builds up its 
argumentative discourse 'progressively, i.e., ‘stone-by-stone’'.43 The reluctance of 
the Court to cite or draw on materials from outside the EU has also been 
criticized.44 Thus, anyone expecting that the significance of the case for data 
protection on the Internet would inspire the Court to adopt a more discursive 
style in the manner of the European Court of Human Rights, the German 
Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court), or the US Supreme Court 
was bound to be disappointed, which may play a role in some of the criticism the 
judgment has received.  
Advocate General Jääskinen recognized the importance of the case for the 
global Internet and the need to strike 'a correct, reasonable and proportionate 
balance between the protection of personal data, the coherent interpretation of the 
objectives of the information society and legitimate interests of economic 
operators and internet users at large' (paragraph 31 of his opinion), but the Court 
seemed disinterested in these factors.45 For example, the Court based its decision 
on the special data protection risks posed by Internet search engines (paragraphs 
36-38 and 80), and thus established in effect a different regime for application of 
the right to suppression in the online world than applies offline. The judgment 
would have benefited in this regard from reference to comparative and 
international legal materials dealing with the protection of fundamental rights on 
the Internet, such as the resolution of the UN Human Rights Council of 29 June 
2012 finding that the rights to freedom of expression and to cross-border 
communication must apply in both the online and offline worlds.46 
                                                     
40 Gráinne de Búrca, 'After the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: The Court of Justice as a Human 
Rights Adjudicator?', 20 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 168, 184 (2013). 
41 Vlad Perju, 'Reason and Authority in the European Court of Justice', 49 Virginia Journal of International 
Law 307, 310 (2009). 
42 Joseph Weiler, 'The Judicial Après Nice', in: The European Court of Justice (Gráinne de Búrca and J.H.H. 
Weiler eds.) 215, 224 (OUP 2001). 
43 Lenaerts (n 37), at 1351. 
44 de Búrca (n 40), at 173, referring to 'a remarkable lack of reference on the part of the Court of Justice 
to other relevant sources of human rights law and jurisprudence'.  
45 See, e.g., para. 81, stating with regard to the seriousness of the interference with data protection and 
privacy rights at stake in the case, 'it is clear that it cannot be justified by merely the economic interest 
which the operator of such an engine has in that processing'. 
46 UN General Assembly, Human Rights Council, 'The Promotion, Protection, and Enjoyment of 
Human Rights on the Internet', Doc. No. A/HRC/20/L.13, 29 June 2012, 
<http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session20/A.HRC.20.L.1
3_en.doc>. The Human Rights Council has itself emphasized the importance of EU human rights 
standards conforming to UN standards. See UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, 'The European 
Union and International Human Rights Law', 
<http://www.europe.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/EU_and_International_Law.pdf>, at 8. 
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Questions with regard to the different treatment of online and offline data 
processing also arise with regard to the DPA’s dismissal of the claim against the 
newspaper. The Court noted that the case against the newspaper was dismissed 
because its publication of the information complained about was authorized by an 
order of the Spanish Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (para. 16). However, it 
seems that publication in the printed newspaper appeared in 1998 but the online 
publication occurred later (see para. 5 of the Advocate General’s opinion). Given 
that in 1998 online newspaper archives did not exist on a large scale, the 
ministerial order could hardly have had them in mind when it was issued. 
Moreover, although the date the order was issued is not given, it must have dated 
from long before the Lisbon framework, and thus could not have taken into 
account the increased value given to data protection since the framework came 
into force. While the question of whether the right to suppression should apply to 
the newspaper was not before the Court, the importance of the case for striking a 
balance between the fundamental rights to data protection and freedom of 
expression called for a more detailed explanation of the legal status of the order of 
the Spanish Ministry and why it resulted in the newspaper being exempted from 
application of the right. 
The Court could also have mentioned in this regard the decision of the 
European Court of Human Rights in Times Newspapers Ltd. v. UK, where the Court 
found that Internet news archives fall within Article 10 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights protecting freedom of expression, stating: 
 
  In light of its accessibility and its capacity to store and communicate vast 
amounts of information, the Internet plays an important role in enhancing 
the public’s access to news and facilitating the dissemination of information 
generally. The maintenance of Internet archives is a critical aspect of this role 
and the Court therefore considers that such archives fall within the ambit of 
the protection afforded by Article 10.47  
 
However, the judgment does not even mention in its reasoning the European 
Convention on Human Rights or the jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights. 
The role of the CJEU is changing, and its audience and visibility are 
broadening.48 As the attention given to the judgment has shown, a major decision 
of the CJEU dealing with the Internet receives worldwide publicity. The judgment 
implied that the Court is aware that it will result in EU law applying to non-EU 
data controllers that are not subject to the enforcement jurisdiction of the EU 
                                                     
47 Times Newspapers Ltd v. the United Kingdom (nos. 1 and 2), nos. 3002/03 and 23676/03, § 27, 10 
March 2009.  
48 See Perju (n 41); J.H.H. Weiler, The Constitution of Europe (CUP 2005), at 212-214. 
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courts and DPAs,49 in which case it must have an interest in bolstering the 
international acceptance of its rulings. The Article 29 Working Party has also 
recognized that the extraterritorial application of EU data protection law may 
serve to persuade non-EU data controllers to comply with EU data protection 
law, even when it may not be possible to enforce the law against them.50 
Mentioning the international implications of the judgment would only have 
increased the respect given to it by the international community.51 Especially in 
cases involving an international communications medium like the Internet, the 
Court must avoid 'withdrawing into one’s own constitutional cocoon, isolating the 
international context and deciding the case exclusively by reference to internal 
constitutional precepts'.52 
 
B. NEED FOR FURTHER INFORMATION ABOUT THE SCOPE OF THE 
 PROBLEM 
 
We need more information about the requests to exercise the right to suppression 
that are being made and how they are being dealt with in order to determine how 
the right should best be implemented. Only when there is a sufficient body of 
reliable information about the scope of the issues created by the judgment will it 
be possible to decide what steps should be taken to deal with them.  
Google has stated that as of 18 July 20014, it had received over 91,000 
requests for suppression involving over 328,000 URLs,53 which seems like a huge 
number considering that the judgment was handed down a little over two months 
                                                     
49 See para. 84, stating 'Given the ease with which information published on a website can be replicated 
on other sites and the fact that the persons responsible for its publication are not always subject to 
European Union legislation, effective and complete protection of data users could not be achieved if the 
latter had to obtain first or in parallel the erasure of the information relating to them from the publishers 
of websites.'  
50 Article 29 Working Party, 'Working document on determining the international application of EU data 
protection law to personal data processing on the Internet by non-EU based websites' (WP 56, 30 May 
2002), at 15, stating that even if EU data protection law cannot be enforced in third countries, 'there exist 
examples that the foreign web site may nevertheless follow the judgment and adapt its data processing 
with a view to developing good business practice and to maintaining a good commercial image'. See also 
Dan Jerker B. Svantesson, 'The Extraterritoriality of EU Data Privacy Law—Its Theoretical Justification 
and Its Practical Effect on US Business', 50 Stanford Journal of International Law 53 (2014), arguing that 
jurisdictional claims under EU data protection law that cannot be enforced but that signal 'a perceived 
right to regulate a particular matter while acknowledging the lack of ability to regulate that matter' can still 
serve a useful function.  
51 See de Búrca (n 40), at 171, who states that overcoming its reluctance to consider and refer to legal 
standards outside the EU 'would provide the Court of Justice with relevant information on the prevailing 
international and regional standards of protection for particular rights, and also on the approach of other 
international and regional courts to addressing comparable claims, as well as demonstrating to litigants 
and others concerned by its rulings that the Court has engaged fully and knowledgably with the relevant 
arguments'. 
52 Joseph Weiler, 'Editorial: EJIL Vol. 19:5',  <http://www.ejiltalk.org/letters-to-the-editor-respond-to-
ejil-editorials-vol-195/>, describing the approach of the CJEU in the Kadi judgment (Joined Cases C-402 
& 415/05P, Kadi & Al Barakaat Int'l Found. v. Council & Commission, [2008] ECR 1-6351).  
53 See letter of 31 July 2014 from Google Global Privacy Counsel Peter Fleischer to Isabelle Falque-
Pierrotin, Chair of the Article 29 Working Party, 
<https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B8syaai6SSfiT0EwRUFyOENqR3M/edit>, at 11. 
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earlier. This is consistent with surveys that have shown that 'the majority of 
European Internet users would want to claim their ‘right to be forgotten’'.54 The 
Article 29 Working Party has embarked on a dialogue with three leading search 
engine providers (Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo)55 which is apparently designed 
to lead to it issuing a set of guidelines on the questions raised by the judgment, and 
Google has since released a summary giving more information about its approach 
to dealing with suppression requests.56 But more information is needed about 
issues such as what types of Internet services are covered; what information is 
required from an individual to make a request; what sorts of requests are received; 
what search domains are covered; and what the procedure is for evaluating a 
request.  
Ideally this information would be compiled by a neutral third party, but it 
seems that only the search engines themselves have access to detailed information 
about the requests to exercise the right that are made to them. It is not clear that 
there is any mechanism for compelling search engines to turn over such data, 
failing a complaint being made to a DPA or court. However, search engines and 
DPAs will hopefully agree on a cooperative procedure for compiling and sharing 
such information, such as currently seems to be underway under the auspices of 
the Article 29 Working Party and which would be in the interest of all sides. 
 
C. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RIGHT 
 
The Court put the burden of implementation almost completely on data 
controllers, with involvement of courts and DPAs only foreseen in response to a 
complaint concerning a decision by the controller.57 This approach has been 
criticized, since it seems to allow Internet companies to decide on the scope of 
application of the fundamental right to data protection.58 Expecting data 
controllers to be the primary decision-makers concerning application of the right 
is surprising in view of the strong emphasis the CJEU has placed in other cases on 
the necessity for enforcement of data protection rights by independent data 
protection authorities.59 The Court might have referred in some way to the need 
                                                     
54 Special Eurobarometer 359, 'Attitudes on Data Protection and Electronic Identity in the European 
Union', June 2011, <http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_359_en.pdf>, at 158. 
55 See n 16 above. 
56 See letter of 31 July 2014 from Google Global Privacy Counsel Peter Fleischer (n 53). 
57 See para. 77 of the judgment, stating 'Requests under Article 12(b) and subparagraph (a) of the first 
paragraph of Article 14 of Directive 95/46 may be addressed by the data subject directly to the controller 
who must then duly examine their merits and, as the case may be, end processing of the data in question. 
Where the controller does not grant the request, the data subject may bring the matter before the 
supervisory authority or the judicial authority so that it carries out the necessary checks and orders the 
controller to take specific measures accordingly.'  
58 See, e.g., Meg Leta Ambrose, 'EU Right to be Forgotten Case: The Honorable Google Handed both 
Burden and Boon', 19 May 2014, <http://playgiarizing.com/2014/05/19/eu-right-to-be-forgotten-case-
the-honorable-google-handed-both-burden-and-boon/>. 
59 See Case C-518/07 Commission v. Germany, 9 March 2010, 
<http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=79752&doclang=en>; Case C-614/10, 
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for dialogue between data controllers and supervisory authorities in setting the 
parameters for how the right is implemented, or could have tailored the 
compliance duties it expects search engines to follow more precisely. 
The judgment requires not just an application of the fundamental right to 
data protection, but a balancing between the various right concerned.60 The Court 
did not expressly list all the rights at issue, but besides data protection and privacy 
this must include freedom of expression and information.61 Private companies are 
simply not in a position to make complex decisions on the balancing of different 
fundamental rights, a task that is difficult even for courts, data protection 
authorities, and academics. It is thus essential that the procedures for deciding on 
suppression requests involve the data protection authorities to some extent. One 
way to do this could be to agree on a code of conduct or code of practice 
involving both private sector data controllers and the supervisory authorities, as 
foreseen by the proposed EU Data Protection Regulation.62 
It will also be necessary to find a way to automate decisions about whether or 
not to suppress a link to search results. The volume of suppression requests is 
already so large that it seems nearly impossible to decide them quickly if each one 
is considered individually. For instance, taking just the 91,000 requests for 
suppression that Google says it received by 18 July 2014, if only 10 minutes were 
devoted to each case, and assuming a team of 100 persons trained in fundamental 
right law working 8 hours per day, it would still require almost 190 days, or over 
half a year, to resolve all of them. Further review of such requests by DPAs and 
national courts would only lengthen the process, and the number of requests 
could increase greatly if they start being made in large numbers to web sites other 
than search engines. As this does not represent a satisfactory remedy for 
individuals, some automated procedure, perhaps involving a code of conduct or 
the use of technology, seems necessary to ensure that individuals can assert the 
right to suppression in an effective manner.63  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                       
Commission v. Austria, 16 October 2012, 
<http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=128563&pageIndex=0&doclang=
en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=519542>. 
60 See paras. 74, 76, and 81 of the judgment regarding the necessity of a balancing process.  
61 See Article 11 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
62 See Article 38 of the proposed EU General Data Protection Regulation (n 12), referring to the 
possibility of categories of data controllers and processors to draw up codes of conduct, which they can 
then submit for approval to the Commission or the DPAs. 
63 See para. 58 of the judgment, mentioning the need to ensure 'the directive’s effectiveness and the 
effective and complete protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons which the 
directive seeks to ensure', and para. 84, emphasizing the need for 'effective and complete protection of 
data users'.  
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The judgment is a harbinger of the future of EU data protection law under the 
Lisbon framework and the proposed EU General Data Protection Regulation. 
While the parameters of the 'right to be forgotten' proposed under the Regulation 
are not identical with the those of the right to suppression affirmed in the 
judgment,64 the proposed Regulation addresses the same basic issue considered 
there, namely the difficulty of limiting access to data once they are made available 
on the Internet.65 The judgment gives increased urgency to finalizing and enacting 
the EU reform proposals, since they provide the EU legislator with the 
opportunity to refine and further specify the right to suppression beyond what a 
court can do in a single judgment.  
The accomplishment of the judgment is to clarify the application of EU data 
protection law to the Internet, and to affirm the right to suppression of personal 
data in the context of Internet search engines. The judgment also demonstrates 
how enactment of the Lisbon framework strengthens the standards for data 
protection under EU law, particularly as it was issued barely a month after the 
CJEU invalidated the EU Data Retention Directive based on fundamental rights 
considerations in the case Digital Rights Ireland.66 The fact that the Court was 
unwilling to reach a result that would have effectively exempted search engines 
from the requirements of EU data protection law is also not unexpected.67 
However, as the Article 29 Working Party has recognized, 'data protection 
rules only contribute to the protection of individuals if they are followed in 
practice'.68 European human rights law also requires that remedies for data 
protection violations be effective in practice as well as in law.69 The major 
question concerning the judgment is thus whether it will really lead to a greater 
protection of online data protection rights in practice. The answer to this question 
is uncertain, so that the judgment is like a medieval cathedral that is only half-
finished and may take a great deal longer before its final impact can be evaluated. 
                                                     
64 The differences between Article 17 of the proposed EU General Data Protection Regulation (n 12), 
which deals with the so-called right to be forgotten, and the CJEU’s holding are too complex to go into 
here. See also the Advocate General’s opinion (n 13), para. 110. 
65 See, e.g., Recital 53 of the proposed EU General Data Protection Regulation (n 12), stating in part 
'This right is particularly relevant, when the data subject has given their consent as a child, when not 
being fully aware of the risks involved by the processing, and later wants to remove such personal data 
especially on the Internet'; Viviane Reding, 'The EU Data  Protection Reform 2012: Making Europe the 
Standard Setter for Modern Data Protection Rules in the Digital Age', 22 January 2012, 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-12-26_en.htm>, stating 'The Internet has an almost 
unlimited search and memory capacity. So even tiny scraps of personal information can have a huge 
impact, even years after they were shared or made public. The right to be forgotten will build on already 
existing rules to better cope with privacy risks online'. 
66 C-293/12 and C-594/12, 8 April 2014. 
67 See in this regard Hielke Hijmans, 'Case C-131/12, Google Spain and Google Inc v. AEPD et Costeja 
Gonzalez', Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law (forthcoming, 2014). 
68 Article 29 Working Party, 'Working Document: Transfers of personal data to third countries: Applying 
Articles 25 and 26 of the EU data protection directive' (WP 12, 24 July 1998), at 5. 
69 See, e.g., Rotaru v Romania (2000) ECHR 191, at para. 67. 
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Of course, the Court’s main task was to answer the questions referred to it. But it 
could have provided more detail concerning key points such as the types of 
Internet services the judgment applies to; whether it is limited to searches based 
on a person’s name; the domains that are covered; and the territorial application of 
the judgment. Given the implications of expecting private sector data controllers 
to resolve complex balancing situations involving fundamental rights, it could also 
have been expected that the Court would send a signal that cooperation with the 
DPAs is essential in this regard. However, the Court failed to explore in sufficient 
detail some issues that were important to provide full answers to the questions 
referred to it, such as application of the balancing test involved in applying the 
right to suppression.70 The judgment’s minimalist style fails to fully address the 
relevant issues and the global impact of the case, and can only diminish the respect 
given to the judgment outside the EU.  
A fuller discussion of the judgment’s implications for the Internet would also 
have strengthened the Court’s reasoning. For example, it may be asked how the 
Court can conclude that the rights of data subjects protected by Articles 7 and 8 of 
the Charter (i.e., the rights to privacy and data protection) override as a general 
rule the interest of Internet users (para. 81) when it never explains what that 
interest is. This willingness to give data protection interests priority over other 
fundamental rights is a leap of logic requiring fuller explanation than the Court 
gave, as does its assumption that the risks presented by the Internet are greater 
than the benefits it brings. 
While the Court’s inclination to provide strong protection to online data 
protection rights is laudable, the judgment is thus less impressive in its 
consideration of the case’s long-term implications. This indicates that the Court 
has not yet found a way of applying the Lisbon framework to online data 
processing in a way that provides effective protection in practice as well as in 
theory. The judgment provides a strong affirmation of online data protection 
rights, but fails to indicate a way forward for their effective implementation and 
realization, the development of which will likely be a struggle for data controllers, 
DPAs, and courts.  
The protection of individual rights in practice has traditionally been one of 
the main weaknesses of EU data protection law,71 and at the moment there is no 
reason to believe that the situation will be different with regard to the right to 
suppression. One can also ask why so much public attention is being given to the 
'right to be forgotten', while other important data protection issues languish in 
relative obscurity.72 
                                                     
70 See on this point Steve Peers, 'The CJEU’s Google Spain judgment: failing to balance privacy and 
freedom of expression', 13 May 2014, <http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.co.uk/2014/05/the-cjeus-google-
spain-judgment-failing.html>. 
71 See, e.g., European Commission, 'First Report on the Implementation of the Data Protection Directive 
(95/46/EC)', 15 May 2003, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52003DC0265&from=en>, at 12. 
72 For example, the fact that many DPAs in the EU apparently lack the financial and human resources to 
carry out their functions receives little media attention. European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 
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The questions raised in this article concerning the scope of the judgment can 
undermine the intellectual coherence of the right to suppression if they are not 
adequately addressed. If the material and territorial scope of the right are 
disproportionately broad, DPAs will not be able to oversee its implementation in a 
way that protects fundamental rights, given the limited resources they have at their 
disposal and the fact that their enforcement jurisdiction ends at the borders of 
their respective Member States.73 The wording of the judgment does not exclude a 
wide interpretation of the judgment’s scope, but this will likely have to be specified 
by further court decisions and DPA action as the judgment is implemented. A way 
must be found to make the scope of the right to suppression proportionate to the 
ability to implement it in practice, if it is not to become so all-encompassing as to 
be meaningless. 
Finding that the fundamental right of data protection applies to Internet 
search engines should be the beginning, not the end, of the discussion.74 We must 
move beyond the affirmation of data protection rights under the Lisbon Treaty to 
find a way to implement them that leads to effective protection in practice. This 
will be a work in progress, as data controllers struggle to develop a procedure for 
balancing different rights, DPAs find a role in overseeing implementation, and 
courts deal with disputes concerning the right to suppression that are brought 
before them. Hopefully a code of conduct or some other cooperative mechanism 
that is applicable on an EU-wide basis can be developed in this regard. The 
decisive question is whether data controllers and the DPAs will be able to 
implement the judgment effectively and in a way that respects both data 
protection and other fundamental rights. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                       
'Data Protection in the European Union: the Role of National Data Protection Authorities' (2010), 
<http://fra.europa.eu/fraWebsite/attachments/Data-protection_en.pdf>, at 42. 
73 Regarding the territorial jurisdiction of the DPAs, see EU Data Protection Directive, Article 28. See 
also Digital Rights Ireland, C-293/12 and C-594/12, 8 April 2014, para. 68, stating that it cannot be fully 
assured that data stored outside the EU are subject to control by the EU DPAs. 
74 See James Griffin, On Human Rights (OUP 2009), at 95, stating that a '[h]uman right can be at stake in 
ways that are not especially important […]' 
